2 teleological implications inherent in theories of secularization or modernization, recent studies have revealed how conflicts between liberalism and ultramontanism overlapped with existing confessional antagonisms and contributed to the formation of modern party systems and socio-political milieus. 5 Intellectual and cultural historians have discovered in anticatholicism a discourse and practice through which liberal ideas of subjectivity, sociability, and nation were constructed. 6 Most studies of the transnational culture wars, like the other essays in this special issue, break off prior to the First World War. Yet, if measured by acts of violence, anticlericalism peaked in the 1920s and 1930s, when thousands of Catholic priests and believers were imprisoned or executed and hundreds of churches razed in Mexico, Spain and Russia. While the historical literature on anticlericalism in these three countries continues to grow, 7 there has been little effort to develop a wider theoretical 5 O. Blaschke, "Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein zweites konfessionelles Zeitalter?," Geschichte und 3 and transnational framework, such as has emerged around the study of the nineteenth century culture wars. 8 Why have investigations of anticatholicism's role in the formation of political culture generally not extended into the twentieth century, except in the Spanish case? 9 The most obvious answer is that the Kulturkampf had simply abated. Historian Martin Conway names several developments in interwar Europe that point in this direction, among others, the inclusion of centrist Christian parties in pluralistic democracies, the weakening of confessional divisions, and the retreat of liberals and social democrats from anticlericalism. Conway considers anticlerical violence to have been a largely marginal phenomenon, limited to Spain or located outside of Western Europe. Thus he suggests that the Vatican's fears of radical secularism, expressed in numerous encyclicals, was a misreading of a largely benevolent postwar environment that stemmed either from the residual trauma of the nineteenth-century culture wars or the desire to round up the flock. 10 Yet, this depiction fails to convince. For, while it is true that many liberals in France, Germany, and Italy found anticatholicism less appealing after the First World War, anticlericalism increasingly became a tactic embraced by political extremists, particularly, but not exclusively, on the left. In the public sphere, the actions of these groups became linked to the news of atrocities in Mexico, Russia and Spain, thereby raising the stakes of local politics. Even where anticlericalism did not lead to physical violence, rhetorical violence was common in press, pulpit, association, and street demonstration, i.e. in the realm of culture broadly defined.
The term "culture war" can be usefully applied to the 1920s and 1930s not in order to make an argument about continuity, but rather to benefit from some of the methodological innovations that have recently taken place in the study of nineteenth- 8 Although it focuses on physical violence in civil wars and does not look at culture more broadly, a useful starting point is provided by J. de la Cueva Merino, "El asalto de los cielos: una perspectiva comparada para la violencia anticlerical española de 1936" Ayer 88/2012 (4): 51-74. 9 A collaborative research project is underway at the University of Alcalá: "Catholicism and Secularization in 20 th Century Spain." 10 M. Conway, "The Christian Churches and Politics in Europe, 1914 Europe, -1939 in Cambridge History 5 anticommunism appears so obvious in retrospect that scholars have not considered it worthy of further investigation. 16 Given, however, that nineteenth-century liberalism and ultramontanism first produced their full articulation through their interaction, then interwar Christian antibolshevism should not be taken for granted, but rather studied in its evolving relationship to communist anticlericalism. where the Republican government declared a radical separation of church and state in 1931. However, it was principally through the Russian Revolution and its antireligious campaigns that Catholic leaders interpreted radical secularism elsewhere, such that, as historian Emma Fattorini put it, "anti-clericalism of heterodox origins was put down entirely to a sort of meta-historical force of communism." 17 Existing histories of the relations between the Holy See and the Soviet Union have incorporated Germany largely in its role as a diplomatic mediator. 18 This essay instead 16 Emma Fattorini writes that "While the [encyclical] condemning communism is stronger, given that there is no possibility of its redemption, it is more doctrinal, less ringing and biblical, than that against the twisted cross that had been erected in place of the cross of Christ." E. Fattorini, Europe (1917 Europe ( -1989 Despite mutual hostility, the Vatican and Moscow each had reasons for coming to an understanding. Vatican diplomacy was guided by two major considerations. First, it sought to secure pastoral access and care for an estimated 2,200,000 million Catholics and 65,000 practitioners of the "Eastern rites" living under Soviet domination. 21 Second, it sought to make the most of the crippling blow inflicted by the Bolsheviks on the Russian Orthodox Church. Pius XI hoped to overcome the schism of 1054, not through the union of the churches desired by many Orthodox believers, but rather through the conversion to Catholicism of the Russians living in the USSR and in exile. 22 The pursuit of these aims opened the Vatican to charges of opportunism. 
Soviet religious policy in the 1920s
As historian Daniel Peris and others have shown, Soviet religious policy varied considerably in the 1920s. In the chaotic period following the Civil War, the Bolsheviks had focused on disabling the hierarchy and fomenting a schism within the Russian Orthodox Church. During the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was marked by efforts to stimulate the economy and win popular support for the new regime, limited private enterprise was reintroduced. In line with overtures being made to the peasantry, some party leaders argued for limited toleration of local church congregations, particularly the growing sects. At the same time, the party supported 9 broad antireligious education, and in 1925 created a nominally voluntary organization, the League of the Godless. 25 League policy fluctuated between seeking to combat religion via propaganda and its direct suppression through violence. The decisive swing from a "culturalist" to an "interventionist" mode in 1929 reflected the overall shift in the Bolshevik regime associated with collectivization and the building of socialism. 26 Historians have tied this "great turn" to Stalin's consolidation of power, but also to tensions arising from the contradictions of NEP. Homologous contradictions manifested themselves in the religious sphere. On the one hand, there was mounting demand within the state for antireligious action, which is revealed in the forced growth of the League, now called the Militant Godless, from 100,000 members in 1925 to 700,000 in 1929. 27 On the other hand, a "religious wave" was sweeping the Soviet Union, which saw the recovery of 34 AA.EE.SS., Russia, pos. 626, fasc. 13-18, 1920 -37, fol. 14, Pacelli to Gaspari, May 6, 1927 ASV, ANB 30, fasc. 4, fol. 238, Pacelli to d'Herbigny, 19 July, 1929. and rose up against the state in civil insurrections, which only confirmed to Bolsheviks that they were indeed locked in a life and death struggle with capitalist enemies. 35 The April 1929 decree "on religious associations" created the legal framework for a broad persecution of churches and sects. It declared illegal key elements of religious practice, such as youth instruction and the distribution of literature. It also required local church elders to assume personal responsibility for church upkeep, taxes and insurance, expenses that could--analog to the high quotas for grain--be arbitrarily increased to force individuals into arrears and open them to legal prosecution for an act of hostility to the state. According to historian Sandra Dahlke, the chief aim of the 1929 decree was to destroy religious congregations as sites of "potential opposition to agricultural collectivization." 36 The antireligious dynamics generated by the state-driven civil war narrowed any (GPU), the seventeen "wealthy" ringleaders admitted to a series of "outrageous crimes."
Kelsch was accused of urging parents to keep their children out of the Soviet school, forbidding girls from joining non-Catholic youth groups, and ostracizing those living out of wedlock. These "crimes" seem plausible given the self-understanding of many rural Catholic clergy of the day. However, when the article quotes Kelsch as saying, "I am a principle supporter of the bourgeoisie, because they support religion and faith," Marxist class jargon was clearly being placed in his mouth in order to justify punishment and, most importantly, to produce a didactic lesson for the readers. 39 The journalists and police interrogators who authored this lesson mobilized a host of specifically anticatholic clichés to describe Kelsch. He used "medieval methods" in youth instruction, and acted like a "real Jesuit" against the village poor. Those he considered guilty of sins had to kneel in church "or stand for hours in the church yard lightly clad in the bitter cold with outstretched hand--like Christ on the cross." The press reports peaked in the bizarre allegation that Kelsch had established a Dominican order for boys and a Jesuit order for villagers to engage in secret anti-Soviet violence. 40 The final article completed the lesson: "The conclusions that we must take from the Kelsch story are clear: merciless struggle against church and clergy of whatever type." 
Freethinkers in Central Europe
While the inability to check the systematic persecution of clergy in the Soviet Union was the primary factor behind decision to announce the papal "crusade," the church was also concerned about communist promotion of anticlericalism internationally, particularly in Germany. This wild dance of the cannibals of the counterrevolution, these howls of the […] clerical hyenas that accompany the rattling of sabers, spurs, and censers do not Shortly after receiving this request, Faulhaber issued a pastoral letter with directions that it be read from all church pulpits on October 4, 1931. The letter updated the universal prayer: "deliver us, merciful Father, from unemployment and hunger! … Into your wounds, crucified Christ, we lay our dire worries about the existence of our 60 H. Gottwald, "Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland," in Lexikon zur Parteiengeschichte. Deutschland (1789 Deutschland ( -1945 (Leipzig: VEB Bibliographisches Institut, 1986), 460. 61 AA.EE.SS., Russia, scatola 6, fasc. 44, fol. 94, Algermissen to d 'Herbigny, April 7, 1932 62 Algermissen to Faulhaber, Sept. 10, 1931, Faulhaber Archive, no. 7088/1, unpag. 
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Christian religion in our fatherland. The Godless are at work to blasphemy your name, eliminate your commandments, persecute your church, destroy the peace of the nations." It also contained a directive to the Bavarian clergy and laity to shift from "unfruitful lamentations over the godlessness of the godless to positive defense."
Faulhaber called on them to reawaken the Volksverein in Bavaria and found new chapters in the spirit of Ludwig Windthorst, the great nineteenth-century leader of the Center Party and founder of the Volksverein. 63 The effectiveness of church efforts is reflected in the conclusion reached in February 1933 by the Bishop of Bamberg that "today there can be no faithful Catholic who does not recognize the threat of godlessness and has not joined the battle ranks of Catholic Action." 64 In other words, after three years of a well planned campaign that used pulpits and newspapers, popular meetings and even radio broadcasts, the church's antibolshevik and antisecularist message had reached every practicing Catholic.
Political impact of transnational struggles
The ultimate victims of interwar Kulturkampf in Germany were not the ostensible targets--the KPD or the Catholic Church--but rather the Social Democratic and Catholic Center Parties. The two parties repeatedly formed national cabinets and, until 1932, jointly governed Germany's largest state, Prussia. This cooperation formed a bulwark against authoritarian solutions to Germany's political and cultural crises, but it was particularly vulnerable to religious politics. On school policy, for example, the parties often had to agree to disagree. The Center Party was never able to pass a school law that protected de facto Catholic prerogatives over curriculums and appointments, and the SPD, for its part, was only able to push through secularizing legislation in individual states. 65 The reason for this was that religion and worldview were constitutive parts of each party's respective social milieus. The stable years of the Weimar Republic between 1924 and 1929 saw a softening of the "confessional" boundaries that divided Catholic and socialist communities. Carl Sonnenschein, a priest and Volksverein missionary among working-class Berliners, observed signs of the replacement of anticlericalism with growing tolerance and religious pluralism in socialist circles. 66 The Kulturkampf counteracted this process of deconfessionalization.
The crude anticlericalism of the KPD that alienated most of the German population reinforced solidarity within its urban, working-class base. Erich Honecker 68 Kaiser, Freidenkerverbände, [148] [149] [150] [insert fig. 3] The impact of the Kulturkampf on the Center Party was a complex one. On the one hand, it stimulated party cohesiveness, by energizing the base and strengthening religious solidarity within the Catholic milieu. A report on Freethought at the Fulda Bishops conference in August 1930 had found that "the boundary between socialist and non-socialist lifestyles appears to be eroding more and more in [confessionally] mixed industrial regions." The bishops hoped that the struggle against Freethought could help reverse this trend. 69 In a model sermon against godlessness to be read for the feast of "Christ the King" in October 1931, Volksverein priest Richard Bigenwald foresaw that "just as the Kulturkampf once purified and steeled religious life, […] so the great trials of our day will prove to be a source of blessing for us." 70 The struggle against godlessness came on the heels of a major crisis of the Center Kirche / 1918 -1933 increasingly announced that among all Weimar parties, Center represented "the party Although the Brüning cabinet took Germany further down the road of towards authoritarian rule, its commitment to liberal civic rights meant that it could only curb the excesses of anticlerical agitation but not eliminate secularism outright. In a December 1931, the Archbishop of Breslau wrote to Chancellor Brüning of his concern that "the same government that has shown a strong hand in the use of bureaucratic means to protect state authority has not proven strong enough against the godless movement in the eyes of the best circles of the Catholic population. Mistrust is growing in these circles to a worrying degree." 87 The manner in which the logic of the Kulturkampf worked against the Center Party and ultimately against the Brüning government is shown by the May 1932 decree 84 Franz von Papen, "La bonne ou la mauvaise Allemagne?" Der Ring, vol. 3, no. 2 (Jan. 12, 1930) Cardinal Faulhaber had sought the Pope's blessing for "the greatest task we face in the new year: the defense against Bolshevism," and complained that the German government was opening the door to atheism by allowing Moscow's agents to operate in all German cities.
Faulhaber to Pius XI, Dec. 15, 1931 , in: L. Volk, ed., Akten Kardinal Michael von Faulhabers 1917 -1945 
Conclusion
While the antireligious violence of the early Soviet Union may have been the most decisive factor in the opening of religious fronts in the latent civil wars that characterized interwar Europe, the German case reveals how national contexts inflected transnational dynamics. Like all increasingly Stalinized communist parties, the 88 AA.EE.SS., Germania IV, pos. 585, fasc. 93, fol. 47-48, Orsenigo to Pacelli, May 7, 1932. 89 Sermon in Munich, Feb. 18, 1934, in Akten Faulhabers I: 853-54. 31 KPD loyally adopted anticlericalism as a campaign generated in the Soviet center and exported via the Comintern. Yet, this campaign also suited the particular interest of the to the more powerful political ideologies and are now largely forgotten, these Christian strategies and discourses represent signature elements of the political culture of the period. The German case suggests that anticlericalism was a key arena for socialist, communist, and social-emancipatory movements of the interwar period. This should be investigated across Europe and, indeed, globally. Animated by anticolonialism and the promise of rapid modernization, communist movements often targeted missionaries and traditional religions as enemies. 91 Thus, most likely, "culture wars" played a larger role in the global history of the twentieth century than has been hitherto recognized. 
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